

**Authors**

Malte Lierl  
Yale University

Marcus Holmlund  
World Bank

Performance Information and Voting Behavior in Burkina Faso's  
Municipal Elections: Separating the Effects of Information Content  
and Information Delivery\*

Malte Lierl<sup>1</sup>  
Marcus Holmlund<sup>2</sup>

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In this chapter, we report a field experiment in Burkina Faso, which aimed to isolate the effects of information content from other channels of influence through which an information intervention could affect voting behavior. The experiment was carried out in 38 rural municipalities, prior to the 2016 municipal elections. These 38 municipalities had been controlled by the same party for the past two electoral cycles, since the first nationwide municipal elections in 2006. In our experiment, we presented 741 randomly selected study participants with detailed information about their previous municipal government's performance along nine indicators of municipal service quality in the areas of health, primary education, water access, and civil services. These indicators reflected national standards for municipal services, i.e. widely accepted service delivery targets. Simultaneously, a control group of 752 study participants was presented merely with information about the indicators of municipal government performance, without any information on the actual performance of their previous municipal government. Thus, our experiment varied study participants' access to infor-

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<sup>1</sup>Contact: malte.lierl@yale.edu

<sup>2</sup>Contact: mholmlund@worldbank.org

# Performance Information and Voting Behavior in Burkina Faso's Municipal Elections: Separating the Effects of Information Content and Information Delivery

In this chapter, we report a field experiment in Burkina Faso, which aimed to isolate the effects of information content from other channels of influence through which an information intervention could affect voting behavior. The experiment was carried out in 38 rural

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